Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1979

William Chess v. Lawrence Morris : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
William Chess; Randall Gaither; Attorneys for Appellants;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Appellee;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Chess v. Morris, No. 16085 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1445

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

.
-------------WILLIAM CHESS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
160115

-vsLAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE ~HIBD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND POR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA~ OF UIAR,
THE HONORABLE JAMBS S. SA~,
JUDGE, PRESIDING, DENYING ~ 1 1
COMPLAINT FOR A WRIT OF HA8BAS C~
------------~

..

ROBERT B. HARSllll'
Attontey GE!II'leZ'al

.

. ,

'

;

CRAIG L. ~ :-~ ,.
Assistam: •'t'~neJ'&itll91~

AttorDe7s for
WILLIAM CHESS
Pro Se
P. o. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

~-.~4~

F ! ~~~.

RANDALL GAITHER
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
'\
Attorney for Appellant
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'',

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE----------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT---------------------- 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL----------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS------------------------------ 2
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS
RIGHT TO APPEAL UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH M1ENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS
THE RESULT OF THE REPRESENTATION
CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF HIS
APPOINTED COmlSEL-------------- 9
A. THE REPRESmlTATIONS MADE
BY APPELLANT'S COUNSEL IN
CORRESPONDENCE TO APPELLANT
WERE NOT FALSE OR IMPROPER
REPRESENTATIONS, MID REPRESENTED CORRECT STATEMENTS
OF THE LAW AS SET FORTH BY
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT---------------------- 9
B. THE CORRESPONDENCE TO
APPELLANT FROM HIS COUNSEL
AND THE REPRESENTATIONS
MADE THEREIN FURNISHED A
SOUND BASIS ON \miCH
APPELLANT COULD BASE A
DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO
EXERCISE HIS STATUTORY
RIGHT TO APPEAL------------ 14
POINT II: APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A
FAIR TRIAL NOR HIS DUE PROCESS
OF LAW BECAUSE HE APPEARED
BEFORE THE JURY IN IDENTIFIABLE PRISON CLOTHES------------ 20
POINT III: APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO CONFLICT
OF INTEREST NOR PREJUDICE FROM
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS A
RESULT OF THE REPRESENTATION
OF THE APPELLANT AND A WITNESS
FOR THE STATE BY APPELLANT'S
COUNSEL \mERE THE WITNESS'
CASE HAD ALREADY BEEN DISPOSED
OF PRIOR TO THE TRIAL AT WHICH
APPELLANT WAS REPRESENTED BY
THE SAME COUNSEL--------------- 22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page

POINT IV:

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT
TRIAL 1\TAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND THE
ERRORS COMPLAINED OF BY
APPELLANT WERE IN FACT NOT
ERRORS IN ANY LEGAL
CONNOTATION-----------------CONCLUSION----------------------------------------

28
43

CASES CITED
Anders v. California, 386 u.s. 738 (1967)--------- 17
Andreason v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 182, 493 P.2d
1278 (1972)----------------------------- 27,28
Blanchard v. Bennett, 167 N.W.2d 612 (1969)------- 18
Bresnahan v. People, 487 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1971)---- 23,26
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)-------- 10,12,!~,:
Ciarelli v. State, 441 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. 1969)------ 23
Duran v. Turner, 30 Utah 2d 249, 516 P.2d 353
(1973)---------------------------------- 18
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 u.s. 478 (1964)--------- 34
Estelle v. Williams, 86 s.ct. 1691, reh. denied
96 s.ct. 3182 (1976)-------------------- 20,22
Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905 (CA 4, 1965)------ 23
Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1968)------------------------------ 24
Maimona v. State, 82 N.M. 281, 480 P.2d 171
(1971)---------------------------------- 18
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 u.s. 436 (1965)----------- 34,36,31
Moon v. Maryland, 398 u.s. 319 (1970)------------- 10,12
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 u.s. 711 (1969)----- 10,12,13
0lshen v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied 389 u.s. 874, 88 s.ct.
165, 19 L.Ed.2d 157 (1967--------------- 24
0regon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)---------- 35,36
People v. Morse, 452 P.2d 607 (1969)-------------- 37
Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (CA 5,
1962)----------------------------------- 23
State v. Archuletta, 28 Utah 2d 255, 501 P.2d 263
(1972)---------------------------------- 20,21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-iiMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
State
State
State
State

v.
v.
v.
v.

Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77, 505 P.2d 248 (1973)-Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501 P.2d 107 (1972)-Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977)---------Halton, 116 Ariz. 142, 568 P.2d 1040
(1977)-----------------------------------State v. Hymas, 102 Utah 371, 131 P.2d 791
(1942)-----------------------------------State v. Johnson, 549 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1977)--------State v. King, 564 P.2d 767 (Utah 1977)------------State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d
1047 (1942)------------------------------state v. Mecham, 23 Utah 2d 18, 456 P.2d 156
(1969)-----------------------------------United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied 423 u.s. 1066, 96
s.ct. 805, 46 L.Ed.2d 656 (1975)---------United States v. Pearce, 397 F.2d 128 (CA 4, 1968)-United States ex rel. Means v. Solem, 457 F.Supp.
1256 (o.c.s.o. 1978)----------------------

34
20,22
27
37
33
26
28
32,33
28
24,25
35
24

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4---------------------- 38,41
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 19--------------------- 39,40
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 56--------------------- 39,40,41

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology -iiiAct, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM CHESS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
-vs-

Case No. 16085

LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of an action filed in the Third
Judicial District Court in a habeas corpus petition in which
the appellant sought release from custody of the Warden of
the Utah State Prison by reason of the commitment issued by
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County
in Criminal No. 12095-A.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant's petition came on for hearing on
Thursday, August 17, 1978, before the Honorable James

s.

Sawaya who heard testimony and reviewed .the trial
transcript and ordered that the relief sought in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

complaint for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmation of the order of
the Third District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE

FACTS

The appellant was tried on December 16 and 1?,
1976, before a jury in the Second Judicial District Court

on a charge of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony.
The appellant was one of two co-defendants in the case, each
charged with being an accomplice.

The person who admitted

to robbing the gas station, Ray "Steve" Shearer, was not on
trial because of a previous plea of guilty to the offense
(T.

58).

The evidence, taken in the light most favorable
to the State, included the fact that on the evening of
September 27, 1976, shortly before 10:00 p.m., appellant and
the co-defendant pulled into Star Service Station located
at 2725 Wall Avenue in Ogden, Utah (T. 10).

Appellant was

driving and the co-defendant was sitting in the passenger's
side (T. 10).

The station was self-service, but the two

defendants just sat in the car until the attendant, Gregg
Dunn; went out to see if they needed anything (T. 10).
Appellant then asked Dunn if he (Dunn) could put a dollar's
worth of gas in his car for free

(T. 10) .

Dunn responded

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that he could not oblige them.

Approximately 30 to 45

seconds later, one of the co-defendants pulled out a
dollar and said, "Here's a dollar for some gas if you
will put it in for us."

(T. 11).

putting the gas in for them.

Dunn responded by

At trial, Dunn testified that

during this whole process, the two men in the car kept
making conversation with him and looking nervous (T. 10).
"They kept looking towards the front door [of the station]."
(T.

10, 27).
After Dunn put the gas in, he returned to the

station house to begin closing up.

The defendants did not

leave, but continued to sit there in the car (a blue Ford
Galaxie, approximately a 1964 model, T. 10, 43)

(T.

11).

Upon returning inside, Dunn went to the back room where he
was met by a man with a nylon stocking over his head and a
gun.

(The gun was described by Dunn as looking like a

long barreled low-caliber .22) (T. 11, 12).

This masked

person was later determined to be Robert Shearer,
also went by the name "Steve."

(T. 155).

who

At this time,

the station manager (Mike Martinez) , came in to help close
up, and Shearer demanded that the money in'the night deposit
bag be turned over (T. 12, 13).

The money was given to

Shearer, and he left the station; headed reportedly west
down Doxey Street (T. 13).

Evidence adduced at trial shows

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that Shearer entered the gas station during the tl'me

Dunn
was outside "waiting on" the co-defendants Chess and White
(T.

60).

Further testimony by Mike Martinez revealed

that

the defendants had been inside the station on prior
occasions, knew where the money was kept, and would 1

ikely

have known that only one employee works and "closes up"
at night (T. 33).
Later that same night, a 1964 Galaxie fitting t~
description of the suspect vehicle was spotted at 30th and
Wall

(T. 43), at approximately 10:10 P.M. by Officer Coonradt

of the Ogden City Police Department (T. 42, 43).

He sub-

sequently exited his patrol car, looked at the suspect
vehicle and felt the hood.

He testified that the hood was

warm'!and the engine had therefore been operating very
recently (T. 43).

He then looked around the premises,

noticed a black male in the upstairs apartment, and motioned
him to come down (T. 43).

Two men came down, at which

time Officer C:oonradt explained that an armed robbery had
just occurred, and that the immediate vehicle matched the
suspect vehicle used in the robbery (T. 44).

The two men

(co-defendants Chess and White) stated that the vehicle
belonged to them (T. 44).
Permission was granted to search the vehicle.
Found under the front seat of the car were three pair of a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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woman's nylon

stockings

plastic gun (T. 44, 48).

(all had been cut off), and a gray,
Becoming more suspicious, Officer

Coonradt asked permission of White and Chess to search
their apartment for a white male.

Acting very nervous,

the co-defendants said they did not know a white
had _not seen one (T. 44).

male and

Officer Coonradt looked through

their apartment, and found a holster for a long barreled
revolver or pistol (T. 44).

White and Chess denied any

knowledge of the holster (T. 44).
Further investigation by Officer Coonradt leu him
to the apartment manager, who related that White and Chess
had a friend named Steve, a white male with blond hair
(T. 45).

Further description of Steve by the manager fit

the description of the armed robbery suspect (T. 45).

The

officer then asked White and Chess about this man, at which
time they -admitted that they had a friend named Steve and
that the holster was his (T. 45).
OfficerCoonradtasked about a room next to the
co-defendants'.

They said that the room was vacant, locked,

and never used (T. 45).

Attempting to open the door to the

apartment, Officer Coonradt found it to be chained from the
inside (T. 45).

The door opened a few inches, at which

time the officer saw what appeared to be a person inawhite
shirt move across the room, maybe 20 feet away (T. 46) •
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(The robbery suspect had been described as wearing a
colored shirt

(T. 30).

light
The officer then pushed the door

open, went into the room, and noticed a large window on
the east side of the horne slid completely open (T. 46).

He

testified that the window had been closed when he first
arrived a few minutes earlier (T. 46).
Following this series of events, Chess and White
were asked to come to the police station for questioning
(T. 35).

There, White said that a guy named Steve had

robbed the gas station (T. 37).

White described Steve as

being about 5'11", 27 or 28, having sandy brown hair, a
mustache, goatee, and parting his hair down the middle
(T. 37).

He further stated that Steve had been planning

to rob the gas station (T. 38).
had a

White also stated Steve

.22 with a brown handle, about four to six inches

long (T. 38).

White stated that the guy next door to their

apartrnent was a white friend named Steve, 1 and that Steve
had told him (Chess) that he was going to rob a place
that day, and that he had a gun (T. 55).
Testimony by Ronda Knapp revealed that she not
only knew Shearer, White, and Chess, but had seen them
together on several occasions, particularly the night of the
robbery, September 27, 1976 (T. 70, 71).

She stated that
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she had seen all three of them together about 7:30 p.m.
at the Kokomo Lounge (T. 70, 71), and later saw them all
leave together around 8:30 p.m. or 8:45p.m.

(T. 71).

She

further testified that she had a conversation with Shearer,
Chess, and White in front of the Kokomo Lounge before they
all left (T. 72).

At that time, they were in Chess' car,

with Chess in the driver's seat, White on the passenger's
side in the front seat, and Shearer in the back seat (T. 72).
Shearer asked Ronda if she had any nylons, to which she said
no.

She did, however, ask her friend Pat Wolfe, who in turn

went inside the Lounge, took her nylons off, came back
out and gave them to Shearer (T. 72)

1

.

Shearer, White, and

Chess then left, saying that they would be back in an hour
(R. 73).

Ronda saw Shearer later than evening standing in

front of the lounge, somewhere in the neighborhood of 10:15

p.m.

(T.

72).
Following the events of September 27, Ronda Knapp

did not see Shearer again until the following Thursday,
again at the Kokomo Lounge (T. 73).

She stated that his

appearance was somewhat different, as he had cut his hair

l

Pat Wolfe corroborated this testimony.
She stated that
upon being asked by Ronda for her nylons, she entered the
lounge, took them off, then gave them to Shearer (T. 98).
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and shaved off his goatee (T. 74) . 2

She asked him why he had

cut his hair, to which he responded that he and Chess and
White had robbed a gas station, and "
in and asked
Steve."

. if the cops came

any questions, his name was Raymond and

(T. 74, 75).

not

He also told her that he had to

jump out of a second story building because the

cops came

down to Herbert's (White's) place (T. 75).
There were several inconsistencies in th
of many of the witnesses.

t

e

estimony

The jury, however, apparently

believing the prosecution's version of the events of
September 27, 1976, as well as those events leading up to
and following that night, found appellant guilty.

He was

later sentenced to the Utah State Prison.
At the hearing held before the Court in the habeas
corpus proceeding, the appellant testified that he appeared
in jail clothes at the trial held on December 16 and 17,
1976, in the Second Judicial District.

He stated that he

requested to appear otherwise, but was told by his counsel
that i t was too late to make any arrangements for other
clothes.
Appellant also stated that he did not appeal his
conviction based upon the fact that he received a letter

Ronda Knapp described Shearer's appearan~e.the ~ight of
the robbery, September 27, as follows:
H~s ha~r was
long and he was wearing a goatee and mustache
"He had on a light shirt.
"
(T. 74).
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from his trial counsel which represented that if he was
awarded a new trial, he may be found guilty and sentenced
to a greater prison term than he was presently serving for
the conviction.

A copy of that letter was introduced into

evidence.
ARGU!1ENT

POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH fu~NDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS THE RESULT
OF THE REPRESENTATION CONTAINED IN THE
LETTER OF HIS APPOINTED COUNSEL.
A.
THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY
APPELLANT'S COUNSEL IN CORRESPONDENCE TO APPELLANT WERE
NOT FALSE OR U1PROPER REPRESENTATIONS, AND REPRESENTED
CORRECT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW
AS SET FORTH BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT.
Appellant has claimed that but for improper
representations

of appointed counsel as set forth in a

letter, he (appellant) would have pursued his statutory right
to appeal.

The letter to which appellant refers reads as

follows:
June 6, 1977 . . . Dear Mr. Chess:
As I have discussed with you on several
occasions, it is my opinion that we do
not have any legal issues substantial enough
to allow us to win. Furthermore, if we
were to appeal and win, it would mean a
new trial.
If you were found guilty at a
new trial, you stand a substantial chance
of receiving a sentence of 5-life, rather
than the l-15 you have already been
sentenced to~
Therefore, I recommend
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
that
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notify
theAct,Supreme
that
Library
Services
and Technology
administered byCourt
the Utah State
Library.you
do not intend
to pursue
Machine-generated
OCR, may the
contain appeal.
errors.

I would. like to hear from you as
soon ~s possible regarding your desires
ln thls matter.
If you would like to
appe~l your c<?nviction, I would appreclate lt lf you would outline the
reasons upon which you would like me
to bare the appeal.
The letter was signed by Maurl·ce R'lC h ar d s, trla
· 1 counsel
for appellant.
Appellant bases his argument, as stated in his
brief at p. 4, on the fact that "If awarded a new trial,
the Fourteenth Amendment would have prevented a greater
punishment than he is presently receiving.
Respondent submits that in light of the United
States Supreme Court decisions in North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969); Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970);
and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412

u.s.

appellant's allegation that "

17 (1973), that

. the Fourteenth Amendment

would have prevented the trial court from imposing upon
the appellant a greater punishment than he is presently
receiving "if a new trial were granted, is totally withe~
merit and contrary to existing Federal law.
In North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, the
respondent was convicted of a crime and sentenced to a
prison term.

The original conviction was set aside in a

post-conviction proceeding for constitutional error seven!
years later.
and sentenced.

On retrial, the respondent was again convicted
In one case, the new·sentence, when added
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to the time respondent had served, amounted to a longer
total sentence than that originally imposed; in the other
case, respondent received a longer sentence, with no credit
being given for the time already served.

In neither case

was any justification given for imposition of the longer
sentence.

In holding the sentences unconstitutional, the

supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment bars a harsher sentence where a
retrial is granted:
We hold, therefore, that neither the
double jeopardy provision nor the Equal
Protection Clause imposes an absolute
bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction. A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words,
from imposing a new sentence, whether
greater or less than the original
sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have
thrown new light upon the defendant's
life, health, habits, conduct, and mental
and moral propensities. William v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 245.

395

u.s.

at 723.

Speaking specifically in terms of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said:
. . . whenever a judge imposes a
more severe sentence upon a defendant
after a new trial, the reasons for
his doing so must affirmatively appear.

Id. at 726.
The court went on to state criteria upon which those reasons
must
be
based.
Sponsored
by the
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In Moon v. Maryland, supra, a defendant was found
guilty of armed robbery and sentenced by the judge to 1
years inprisonrnent.

2

On appeal, his conviction was set

aside.

At a second trial for the same offense, the defe d
n an:
was again convicted, but the trial judge imposed a sent
ence
of 20 years imprisonment, less credit for time served under
the original sentence.

The second conviction was affirmed

on appeal, and the United States Supreme Court dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

The Court,

in declaring that the guidelines in Pearce had been met in
the imposition of the harsher sentence on retrial, stated
that reasons for the harsher sentence include "objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of
the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding."

398

u.s.

at 321.

In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the situation where a jury,
functioning in-the sentencing process, imposed a harsher
sentence on retrial and conviction than had the jury on the
original conviction and sentence.

In Chaffin, the

defenda~

was convicted of a felony and sentenced by the jury to 15
years in prison.

On a habeas petition, a retrial was

ordered because of the giving of an improper alibi instrocti~,
Upon retrial before a different judge and jury in the state
court (Georgia) , the defendant was reconvicted and sentenced
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the new jury to life imprisonment.

The new jury was

aware of the previous trial, but unaware of the previous
S entence

imposed therein.

In aff'

·

~rm~ng

h
t e second conviction

and sentence, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Powell, held that:
The rendition of a higher
sentence by a jury upon retrial does
not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Nor does such a sentence
offend the Due Process Clause so long
as the jury is not informed of the
prison sentence and the second
sentence is not otherwise shown to
be a product of vindictiveness. The
choice occasioned by the possibility
of a harsher sentence, even in the
case in which the choice may in
fact be "difficult," does not place
an impermissible burden on the right
of a criminal defendant to appeal or
attack collaterally his conviction.
412 U.S. at 35.
Thus, the law is well settled that the Constitution
does not prohibit the giving of a harsher sentence upon
retrial and reconviction.

If, on the new trial, the sentence

the defendant receives from the court is greater than that
imposed after the first trial, it must be explained by
reasons "based upon objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring
after the time of the original sentencing proceeding," other
than his having pursued the appeal or collateral remedy.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395

u.s.

at 726.

On the other
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hand, if the sentence is imposed by the jury and not by
the court, if the jury is not aware of the original
sentence, and if the second sentence is not otherwise
shown to be a product of vindictiveness, a harsher sentence
will stand.

Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412

u.s.

at 17.

Thus, appellant's contention that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes the trial court from imposing a greater
punishment than he is presently receiving upon retrial and
reconviction is unfounded.

Therefore, the advice given

~

him by his counsel that upon retrial, a harsher sentence
could be imposed, was correct in a legal sense, and not a
misrepresentation of the law.
B.
THE CORRESPONDENCE TO APPELLANT
FROM HIS COUNSEL AND THE REPRESENTATIONS MADE THEREIN
FURNISHED A SOUND BASIS ON WHICH
APPELLANT COULD BASE A DECISION
WHETHER OR NOT TO EXERCISE HIS
STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL ..
Appellant has alleged that because of the
representation of his appointed counsel, he was denied his
right to appeal and therefore he is being unjustly and
unlawfully restrained of his liberty.

He cites a few

cases, which, as he says, support his theory that a
defendant be freed of the apprehension of receiving
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a harsher sentence after the retrial of his case and that the
oue Process Clause forbids harsher sentences after re-trial."
Appellant's Brief, p. 3.

Respondent has already shown

that appellant's theory is not the law.

(See Point I-A,

supra).
Appellant seemingly says that because his counsel
made him aware of the realities of a possible harsher
sentence if a new trial was granted and another conviction
occurred, -he waived his right of appeal.

Such argument

is without merit, as appellant's right to appeal was not
"chilled."

The decision to be made by appellant whether

or not to appeal may have been difficult, but the Constitution
does not forbid or preclude such a decision making process.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Chaffin v.
stynchcombe, 412

u.s.

at 32:

The criminal process, like the
rest of the legal system, is replete
with situations requiring "the making
of difficult judgments" as to-which
come to follow . . . Although a
defendant may have a right, even of
constitutional dimensions, to follow
whichever course he chooses, the
Constitution does not by that token
always forbid_requiring him to choose.
Cite omitted.
The Court, in equating some of the harsh incidental
consequences of exercising the right to remain silent with
exercising a right to appeal, thereby risking a greater or
harsher sentence upon reconviction stated:
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.

.

. Just as in the guilty plea
[forgery right to
:emaln.sllent on the issue of guilt
ln a Slngle trial as opposed to
bifurcated trial] , an incidental
consequence of that practice is that
it may require the accused to choose
whether to accept the risk of a higher
sentence or to waive his rights.
We
see nothing in the right to appeal or
the right to attack collaterally a
conviction, even where constitutional
errors are claimed, which elevates
those rights above the rights to jury
trial and to remain silent.
case~ an~ Crampton

Petitioner w~s not himself
"chilled" in the exercise of his right
to appeal by the possibility of a
higher sentence on retrial and we
doubt that the "chill factor" will
after be a deterrent of any significance.
412

u.s.

. ..

at 32, 33.
Appellant's decision to sign a motion dismissing

his appeal was based on competent advice from his attorney.
The record reveals that on June 6, 1977, appellant's attorne
sent him a letter (see Point I-A, supra) stating his opinion
that there was no legal issue that would support a reversal.
The attorney also pointed out that a victory in the Supreme
Court would simply result in a new trial, with the
possibility that the sentence therein would be more severe
than that which the appellant was already serving.

The

attorney then asked appellant to express his desire as W
whether or not the appeal should be made.

On June 15, 1977,
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the attorney spoke with appellant regarding the appeal,
and on that same date sent to appellant a Motion to Dismiss,
which appellant signed.

That letter also discussed the

attorney's continued involvement in the affairs of the
petitioner in regard to another sentence he was serving at
the time.

This chain of correspondence indicates that the

attorney was acting in appellant's interest by advising
him of the options available to him and by offering to
pursue the appeal if the appellant so desired.

The cor-

respondence also implies that appellant acquiesed

in the

Motion to Dismiss, as is evidenced by his signature on the
letter.

In summary, appellant made an informed decision

not to appeal his conviction.
Appellant's decision not to appeal does not fall
into the category of, nor is it controlled by Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967).

In Anders, the United

states Supreme Court held that where the convicted party
wanted to pursue a first appeal, but his attorney did not
feel that there was grounds to support an appeal and
desired to withdraw, that the attorney had a duty to prepare
a brief discussing all potential sources of appeal and submit
it along with a letter requesting withdrawal from the case and
appointment of new counsel.

In the case at bar, there is no

indication that the appellant desired to pursue an appeal.
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Furthermore, the letter of June 6

,

1977

· d
, ln ica tes that the

attorney would have pursued the appeal at appellant's

regueoState decisions falling within the ambit of the

present factual situation sustain res o d t'
P n en s assertions.
In Duran v. Turner, 30 Utah 2d 249, 516 P.2d 353

(1973),

the Utah Supreme Court held that where a prisoner failed ~
request his attorney or anyone else to file an appeal on his
behalf, especially where ~e (prisoner) had been familiar
with the appeals process, there was no showing that the
attorney was incompetent because of his failure to file q
appeal.
In Maimona v. State, 82 N.M. 281, 480 P.2d 171
(1971), a defendant claimed that his attorney did not perfec:
an appeal even though he had requested him to do so.

The

attorney had written to the defendant and advised him of
his right to appeal, but stated that he was no longer his
attorney.

The record in that case, as in the case at bar,

did not establish that the defendant had requested his
court-appointed attorney to appeal.

The court in Maimona

denied the defendant's request to appeal the order convictin:
him, and stated further, at page 17 4, that refusal to appeal,
standing

alon~

could not indicate inadequacy of representaL:

The Iowa Supreme Court in Blanchard v. Bennett,
167 N.W. 2d 612

(1969), was confronted with a case in

whi~

an attorney had failed to follow the statutory procedures
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for appeal, causing the defendant to lose his right to
appeal.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner

alleged incompetency of counsel for failure to perfect the
appeal.

At page 615, the court concluded:
From a careful review of the
cases which have considered the
problem, two general principles emerge:
(l) failure to appeal is not generally
excused by a mere showing of neglect
of counsel and (2) in any event to
become entitled to relief by way of
collateral attack on such a claim
petitioner must allege and demonstrate
prejudicial error in the trial proceedings.

(emphasis

add~d).

In conclusion then, respondent submits that
appellant has not shown any error in the trial proceedings
that warrants reversal.

Nor has he demonstrated that he

requested that an appeal be pursued.

The advice received

from his counsel was sound, competent, and legally correct
in substance.

Appellant made his decision thereon and

should have to live with his exercise of judgment.
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POINT II
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL
NOR HIS DUE PROCESS OF LAI~ BECAUSE HE
APPEARED BEFORE THE JURY IN IDENTIFIABLE
PRISON CLOTHES.
Appellant contends that his appearance in jail
clothes before the jury denied him his due process of law
and a fair trial.

He claims to have made a request to

his appointed counsel not to appear in jail clothing.
Assuming that appellant's allegations that he
was tried in prison clothing and that he informed his
counsel that he desired otherwise are true, he would
still not be entitled to relief under the controlling
cases of Estelle v. Williams, 96 S.Ct. 1691, reh. denied
96 S.Ct. 3182 (1976); State v. Archuletta, 28 Utah 2d 255,
501 P.2d 263
P. 2d 107

(1972); and State v. Fair, 28 Utah 2d 242, 501

(1972).
In Estelle v. Williams,

~,

a Texas defendant

was tried for a crime of assault with intent to commit
murder.

Unable to post bond, the defendant remained in

custody awaiting trial.

When he learned that he was going

to trial, the defendant asked an officer at the jail for
his civilian clothes.

This request was denied, and the

defendant was tried in distinctly marked prison clothes.
No objection to the clothing was raised at trial, and the
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defendant was convicted and sentenced to the State Pr ·

1 son

The defendant then sought release by means of a federal
writ of habeas corpus.

The United States Supreme Court

held:
• • • the failure to make an objection
to the court as to being tried in such ~lathes
[prison clothes], for whatever reason, ~s
sufficient to negate the Presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional
violation.
96 S.Ct. at 1697 (emphasis added).
The Court, in discussing the requirement that
an accused object to the court to being tried in prison
garments, said that a defendant must invoke or abandon the
right not to be tried in jail clothes, just as he would
invoke or abandon any other right:
"We held [in Hernandez] that the
defendant and his attorney had the burden
to make known that the defendant desired to
be tried in civilian clothes before the
state could be accountable for his being
tried in jail clothes • • • • "
96 s.ct. at 1695.
In State v. Archuletta, supra, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
• • • Even if [the defendant were tried
in jail clothes], it does not strike u~ that
there would be anything strange, shock~ng or
prejudicial if the jury became aware th~t a
man who had been arrested and charged ~~th .
robberv was in custody and being held ~n Jall.
501 P.2d at 264.
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In State v. Fair, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
reached the conclusion that where no objection was made
at trial to the defendant's presence in prison clothes,
there was no error.
The facts of the instant case show no error was
committed.

Neither appellant nor his counsel objected to

the court concerning his desire not to be tried in jail
clothes.

Furthremore, evidence at trial clearly revealed

to members of the jury that appellant was being detained in
custody for some time prior to trial (T.l04,105).

Thus,

even without the presence of the jail clothes, the jury would
have known of appellant's confinement prior to trial.

As

the United States Supreme Court said in Estelle v. Williams,
supra, "'No prejudice can result from seeing that which is
already known.'"

Id. at 1694.

Respondent therefore urges that no error was committed and no prejudice resulted from the appearance of
appellant in his prison clothes at trial.
POINT III
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST
NOR PREJUDICE FROM CONFLICT OF INTEREST AS
A RESULT OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE
APPELLANT AND A WITNESS FOR THE STATE BY
APPELLANT 1 S COUNSEL IVHERE THE WITNESS 1
CASE HAD ALREADY BEEN DISPOSED OF PRIOR
TO THE TRIAL AT WHICH APPELLANT WAS
REPRESENTED BY THE SM1E COUNSEL.
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Appellant alleges in his brief that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel because his

at tor no

was also the attorney for Ray "Steve" Shearer, one of the
prosecution's witnesses.

As authority, he cites cases

which deal with the representation of r:1ultiple defendants
by the same attorney, under varying circUMstances.
The case at bar however is distinguishable froo
the cases and arguments cited by appellant in that in ~e
present case appellant's attorney was representing only
one defendant during the trial.

Shearer, one of the

prosecution witnesses, who was also called by the defense,
had been represented by appellant's attorney when he
(Shearer) had pled guilty to the robbery.

That case, howe.,.,

had been disposed of prior to appellant's trial.
Nevertheless, case law, which appears to be the
majority rule, holds that while the dual representation of
a prosecution witness and a defendant places the attorney
in a conflict of interest, the defendant must demonstrate
that the attorney did something or failed to do somthing
which he otherwise would have, and which resulted in actua:
prejudice to the defendant.

Goodson v. Pevton, 351 F.2d 90:

(CA 4, 1965); Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461 (CA 5,
1962); Bresnahan v. People, 487 P.2d 551 (Colo. 1971); and
Ciarelli v. State, 441 S.W.2d 695

(Mo. 1969).
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In a recent case, United States ex rel. Means
v. Solem, 452 F.Supp. 1256 (D.c.s.o. 1978), the trial court
refused to permit withdrawal of petitioner's counsel because
of a prior attorney-client relationship between petitioner's
counsel and one of the prosecution's witnesses.

Petitioner

alleged that his constitutional rights to effective assistance
of counsel were violated by the trial court's action.
allegations were refuted by the court.

His

In denying petitioner's

claim, the Federal court cited certain factors to be considered
relative to a possible conflict of interest:

(1) a lawyer's

pecuniary interest in future business with the client;

(2)

the possibility that privileged information obtained from the
witness might be relevant to cross-examination.

United States

v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 u.s.
1066, 96 s.ct. 805, 46 L.Ed.2d 656 (1975).

A third considera-

tion or factor cited by the Solem court to be considered in
possible conflict cases is whether the trial transcript
reveals that the defendant's attorney conducted a vigorous
cross-examination.

See Olshen·v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993 (2d

cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 u.s. 874, 88 s.ct. 165, 19 L.Ed.2d
157

(1967); Harrison v. United States, 387 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.

1968).
Turning to the specifics of the case at bar and
applying the factors set forth by the Jeffers and Solem courts,
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it becomes apparent that petitioner h

f 'l d
as a l e to show arc·
particular preJ'udice which may have r·
b
a lsen ecause of the
alleged conflict.
Regarding th f'
t f t
e lrs
ac or, respondent
submits that appellant's attorney was not in a position
to affect a pecuniary interest by his conduct since he ~s
the appointed counsel for Shearer, and had no reasonable
expectation of a continuing relationship.
Referring to the second factors, the use of
privileged information and cross examination, the Jeffers
----.::.

court said:
We think the courts can generally
rely on the sound discretion of members
of the bar to treat privileged information
with appropriate respect. Moreover • . •
it is the witness, rather than the defendant,
who should object to the cross-examination
by his former attorney.
520 F.2d at 1265.
In the case at bar, appellant's attorney advised
the witness, Shearer, not to incriminate himself in any
other matter.

Thus, appellant's attorney was left free to

conduct his examination on matters pertinent to the case
at bar and pertinent to the defense of appellant.
The third factor to be considered is the vigor
with which the witness is examined.

The record (transcrip:

reveals that appellant's counsel conducted a vigorous
examination of Shearer concerning the events of SeptembM
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27, 1976, as well as all events leading up to the night
of the robbery and all events subsequent thereto (T.l42146).

In this respect, it is noteworthy that Shearer's

testimony to the effect that he acted alone in the commission of the crime was actually exculpatory for the appellant
(T.62).

The transcript shows that Shearer, having pled

guilty to the robbery charge, was called as a prosecution
witness as well as a defense witness.

The record also

clearly shows that appellant's attorney was concerned only
that Shearer might incriminate himself in another matter
(T.SB).

Thus, the "door was wide open" for examination

and cross-examination of Shearer by appellant's attorney
regarding the robbery itself and matters incidental
thereto.

The record reveals that no potential conflicting

situations arose.
A final factor considered important by the
courts in discussing conflict of interest is the defendant's
awareness of the potential conflict.
state v. Johnson, 549 S.W.2d 348

Bresnahan, supra;

(Mo. 1977).

There is

nothing contained in the record to show that the appellant
was actually aware of the potential conflict, but it is
significant that the appellant, his co-defendant, and
Shearer were housed in the same cell in the Weber County Jail
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for some time prior to the trial (T.l89).

It is

unreasonable to assume that the appellant was not
aware that his attorney also had represented Shearer,
and that Shearer would be called as a witness.

At no

time prior to, or during the course of the trial, did
the appellant object to this potential conflict.
Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel due to potential conflict of interest is
unsubstantiated by the record in this case.

Appellant

has the burden to persuade the court that his counsel
failed in some manner to represent his interests,
resulting in prejudice to his defense.
560 P.2d 337

(Utah 1977).

State v. Forsyth,

There is no evidence that

appellant's attorney failed to do something he should
have done or that he was in any way hampered in his
defense of appellant.
The standard for effective assistance of

couns~

in Utah was clearly stated in Andreason v. Turner, 27

Ut~

2d 182, 493 P.2d 1278 (1972):
The accused is entitled to the assistance
of a competent member of the Bar, who shows a
willingness to identify with the interests of
the defendant and present such defenses that
are available to him under the law and
.
consistent with the ethics of the profess~on.
493 P.2d at 279.
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The appellant has the burden of proving that the
representation he received was only a sham or pretense.
Andreason, supra.

The record in the case at bar will

not support such a burden.
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT
AND THE ERRORS COMPLAINED OF BY
APPELLANT WERE IN FACT NOT ERRORS
IN ANY LEGAL CONNOTATION.
Appellant has listed several alleged points
of error in Point IV of his brief, which, he says, when
cumulatively viewed, call for reversal.

Examination

of these allegations reveals no support for such a claim.
First, appellant claims that the evidence does
not support the verdict.

The record of course must be

reviewed in the light favorable to the judgment and under
the assumption that the trier of fact believed the evidence
which supports the verdict.

State v. Mecham, 23 Utah 2d 18,

456 P.2d 156 (1969); State v. King, 564 P.2d 767

(Utah 1977).

When this is done, the evidence presented clearly supports
the verdict of the jury.
There is no dispute over the fact that the
appellant and the co-defendant were present at the gas
station immediately prior to the robbery (T.lO).

After

receiving a dollar's worth of gas, they remained at the
station in the car, instead of driving off as most customers
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do following completion of their purchase

(T.l0,11).3

Upon re-entering the station, the attendant, Greg Dunn

,

was robbed by a white male wearing a light shirt (T.30),
later determined to be Ray "Steve" Shearer (T.ll-13).
Later that night, appellant and his co-defen~~
were confronted at the co-defendar.t 's apartment.

There,

the car which they had been driving was searched.
i~

In

were found women's nylon stockings which had been

cut off, very similar to the type stocking used as a
mask by Shearer in the robbery earlier that night (T.44,4e
A subsequent investigation of the co-defendant's apartment
rendered a holster made for a long barrelled revolver or
pistol

(T.44).

4

The investigating officer then

inqu~~

of the apartment manager if the appellant and co-defendant
had a white male friend.

The apartment manager responded

that they indeed had a friend named "Steve," with blond
hair, who was a white male.

Further description of this

man by the apartment manager fit the description of
the armed robbery suspect

(T.45).

3

Greg Dunn testified that the appellant and his companic
acted "very nervous," and kept looking. toward the fron:
of the station during this period of tlme (T.l0,27),

4

The gun used in the robbery was described as being a
long barrelled low caliber .22 (T.ll,l2).
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Following this encounter, evidence reveals
that the officer went back upstairs to a room located
next to co-defendant White's room.

Upon trying to

enter,the officer found the door chained from the inside
(T.45).

He opened the door a few inches and saw what

appeared to be a person in a white shirt moving across
the room (T.46).

The door was then pushed open, at

which time the officer noticed a large window, which
minutes before was closed, now open (T.46).
Appellant and his co-defendant were then asked
to come to the police station, where the co-defendant
White said that guy named "Steve" robbed the gas station.
He gave a description of this person, and related that he
(Steve) had been planning to rob the gas station (T.35-38).
White stated that Steve had a .22 caliber, about 4 to 6
inches long

(T.38).

The appellant stated that the guy in

the room next to his apartment was a white friend named
Steve, who had a gun, and who had told him (appellant)
that he was going to rob a place that day (T.SS).
Testimony by Ronda Knapp revealed that she had
seen Shearer, White and the appellant together prior to
the time of the robbery the same night of the robbery
(T.70,71).

They were at the Kokomo Lounge.

She stated

that she saw them all leave the lounge together at
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approximately 8:45p.m., which was about an hour and
fifteen minutes prior to the robbery (T.71).

She also

revealed that she had a conversation with Shearer, White
I

and appellant before they left, at which time Shearer
asked her for a pair of nylons

(T.72).

The nylons were

supplied by Pat Wolfe, a friend of Ronda Knapp's (T.72,
98).

This occurred while the appellant, Shearer, and

White were sitting in appellant's car, the same car which
was described as being used in the robbery (T.72,43-44),
Several days later, Ronda Knapp saw Shearer agai;.,
at which time she noticed that he had cut his hair and
shaved his goatee (T.74).

Upon inquiring as to why he

had cut his hair, Shearer responded that he, appellant,
and White had robbed a gas station, and " • • • if the cops
came in and asked • • • any questions his name was Raymond
and not Steve."

(T.74,75).

He also related that he had

jumped out of a second story building because the cops
came down to Herbert's (White's) place (T.75).
There were inconsistencies in the testimony,
but apparently the jury in exercising their function,
chose to believe that version of the testimony which
supported the prosecution's theory.

As such, this Court

should not now disturb the verdict as being unsupported
by the evidence.
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Second, appellant complains that the trial
court erred in allowing the statements made by him
after the robbery into evidence without any showing
of the Miranda warning (T.35).

Respondent submits

that the statements made by appellant to the police
prior to his arrest were properly admitted at trial.
The appellant was identified by the victim
of the robbery as having been at the station at or near
the time the principal, Shearer, entered the station.
Within minutes after the crime, the police located the
car that appellant had been driving at the gas station.
The police also located the appellant (T.43).

Because

the appellant and his companion, the co-defendant at
trial, seemed to know a great deal about the robbery,
they were brought down to the police station and interviewed (T.35).

At that time appellant and the co-defendant

made separate statements.

The transcript indicates that

they were interviewed separately (T.46).
In State v. Hasato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 602,
126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court defined
admission and confession:
A confession is an admission of guilt
by the defendant of all the necessary.eleme~ts
of the crime of which he is charged, ~nclud~ng
the necessary acts and intent. An admission
merely admits some fact which connects or tends
to connect the defendant with the offense but
not with all the elements of the crime.
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Only the most strained reading of appellant's
statement could construe it as a confession.

The

statement made by appellant indicates only that he was
at the station at about the time it was robbed.

The

balance is directed toward his knowledge of a third
party named Steve Hadley.

There was no discussion at

the trial as to whether the statement was an admission
or confession, and in fact, it was appellant's attorney
who offered the statement into evidence (T.l63) because
of his belief that the statements were exculpatory
(T.238).

At no time during the trial did appellant

obj~t

to the admission into evidence of the statements.
The statement that appellant now complains of
was voluntarily giveno

Assuming, arguendo, that it was

not voluntarily given, it must be treated as an admissioo
under the definition in Karumai.

The Utah Supreme Court

stated in Karumai at 126 P.2d 1052:
The great weight of authority
and the better reasoned cases hold that
before receiving an admission--as distinguished from a confession--i~ ~vidence,
it is not necessary that a prel1m1nary
showing be made to the effect that the
statement was voluntary.
This holding was followed in State v. Hymas, 102 Utah 371,
131 P.2d 791, 793

(1942).

Therefore, since the statement
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was at least an admission, it is admissible without regard
to whether it was voluntarily given.
Appellant asserts that his statement was made
without him being advised of his Miranda rights.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965}.

See

In that case,

the Court directed its remarks to statements obtained
through interrogation.

At 384

u.s.

484, the Court said:

In dealing with statements obtained
through interrogation, we do not purport
to find all confessions inadmissible.
Confessions remain a proper element in
law enforcement. Any statement given
freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences is, of course,
admissible in evidence. The fundamental
import of the privilege while an
individual is in custody is not whether
he is allowed to talk to the police without
the benefit of warnings and counsel, but
whether he can be interrogated. There is
no requirement that police stop a person
who enters a police station and states
that he wishes to confess to a crime,
or a person who calls the police to offer
a confession or any other statement he
desires to make. Volunteered statements
of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment and their admissibility is
not affected by our holding today.
Since Miranda, the Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
478

(1964}

u.s.

"focus of the investigation" test has been

replaced by the "in custody interrogation" test.

State v.

Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77, 505 P.2d 248 (1973}.
In the case at bar, appellant was asked to accompany
the police officers to the police station.

Officer Coonradt
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testified that at the time he considered the appellant to
be a suspect (T.46), but the suspect was not under arrest
at the time; nor was there any evidence that he objected
to going to the police station.

The fact that the appellaM

was not under arrest at the time is not dispositive of
the issue, United States v. Pearce, 397 F.2d 128

(CA 4, l96s

however, it does reflect on the total situation and the
appellant's reasonable belief that he was or was not "in
custody."

After the appellant was interviewed, he was free

to go, and he did so.

There is no evidence that he was "in

custody" at the time the statement was voluntarily given.
The United States Supreme Court, in a recent

u.s.

492 (1977), discussed

Miranda and the "in custody" doctrine.

In Mathiason, supra,

decision Oregon v. Mathiason, 429

the defendant was asked to come down to the state patrol
office, which he voluntarily did.

The officer advised

Mathiason that he was a suspect in a burglary but that he
was not under arrest, and then falsely stated that Mathiason':
fingerprints had been found at the scene of the burglary.

Th:

defendant,without being advised of his rights, admitted the
burlgary.

The officer was allowed to testify as to this

statement at trial.

After the admission, the officer

advis~

the defendant of his rights and took a taped conversation.
The Oregon Supreme Court held (549 P.2d 673), that the
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interrogation took place in a coercive environment and
that the testimony relating to the conversation prior to
the giving of the Miranda warning was not admissible.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and discussed
the "custodial interrogation" theory at 429

u.s.

495:

In the present case, however, there
is no indication that the questioning took
place in a context where respondent's
freedom to deport was restricted in any
way.
He came voluntarily to the police
station, where he was immediately informed
that he was not under arrest. At the
close of a l/2-hour interview respondent
did in fact leave the police station.
Without hindrance, it is clear from these
facts that Mathiason was not in custody
"or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in ·any significant way."
Any interview of one suspected of a
crime by a police officer will have coercive
aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact
that the police officer is part of a law
enforcement system which may ultimately
cause the suspect to be charged with a
crime. But police officers are not
required to administer Miranda warnings
to everyone whom they question. Nor is
the requirement of warnings to be imposed
simply because the questioning takes
place in the station house, or because
the questioned person is one whom the police
suspect.
In summary, the Supreme Court held in Mathiason
that police station interrogations of a defendant are not
inherently coercive, thus requiring Miranda warnings.
Numerous state court decisions have discussed
the "in custody" theory.

In the California case of
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People v. Morse, 452 P.2d 607

(1969), at 613, the court

stated:
We have also made it clear on a number
of occasions that any determination as to
whether or not a process of interrogations
was undertaken must rest upon an objective
test according to which we "analyze the total
situation which envelopes the questioning by
considering such factors as the length of
the interrogation, the nature of the questions,
the conduct of the police and all other relevant
circumstances."
(People v. Stewart (1965) 62
Cal.2d 571, 579, 43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 206, 400
P.2d 97, 102, affd. sub. non. California v.
Stewart (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694.)
The Arizona Supreme Court stated its test for
custodial interrogation in State v. Halton, 116 Ariz. 142,
568 P.2d 1040 (1977), as being "would a reasonable man feel
that he was deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."
In summary, there are several factors which
indicate that a Miranda warning was not necessary under the
circumstances:

(l) even though the appellant was a suspect

he was not "in custody" at the time he voluntarily made the
statement,

(2) the appellant went to the station house

voluntarily, and was allowed to leave after answering
questions, and (3) the statement was not obtained in a
coercive manner.

-37-
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At the trial, no objection was made to the
introduction of the statement, or to the testimony of
the officer who took the statement.

Apparently the

appellant himself did not view the statement to have
been taken in violation of his constitutional rights
because he did not object to its adMission, nor does
it appear that he viewed it as grounds for appeal at
the time he was asked by his attorney, Mr. Richards, to
identify potential issues for appeal.
Even if, arguendo, the statement was improperly
admitted into evidence, Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence,
is dispositive of the issue:
RULE 4 EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE. A verdict or finding shall
not be set aside, nor shall judgment or
decision based thereon be reversed, by
reason of the erroneous admission of evidence
unless (a) there appears of record objection
to the evidence timely interposed and so
stated as to make clear the specific ground
of objection, and (b) the court which passes
upon the effect of the error or errors is of
the opinion that the admitted evidence should
have been excluded on the ground stated
and probably had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict or finding.
However, the court in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review the erroneous
admission of evidence even though the grounds
of the objection thereto are not correctly
stated.
There was no objection at trial to the evidence,
and in view of the emphasis given the statement by the
defense
attorney
asFunding
being
exculpatory,
it ofcannot
be argued
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that the statement had any substantial influence in
bringing about the guilty verdict.

Appellant's complaint

that the trial court erred in admitting his statement is
therefore not well founded,
Appellant's third complaint alleges that the
prosecutor asked a series of four leading questions
"designed to elicit conclusions which the witness did
not have the ability to draw from his personal observations."

Appellant's brief, p. 9.

The colloquy went as

follows:
(Prosecutor) Q. Mike, inasmuch as
the defendants are familiar with the
station, do you know if they have ever
been inside the station?
(Witness)
A. Yes, they have.
(Prosecutor) Q. Would they know
where the back room is?
(Witness)
A.
Sure.
(Prosecutor)
Q •. I assume they
would know where the money was kept?
(Witness) A. Yes, I imagine
they would.
(Prosecutor) Q. Would they likely
know that only one employee works at
night and closes up?
(Witness)
A.
Yes.
(T.33).
Appellant alleges that the foregoing line of questioning
violated Rules 19 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
There is no foundation in appellant's claim.
Examination of the record reveals that the questions were
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Martinez was the station manager of the station robbed.
He testified on direct examination that he knew appellant
and his companion, co-defendant White (T.29).

He also

testified that they (appellant and co-defendant) had come
into the station to get gas, cigarettes, coke, etc., on
many occasions (T.29).

On cross-examination by appellant's

attorney, Martinez was asked if the co-defendants were
good customers, thereby implying that they frequented the
station on more than one occasion (T.3l).

He replied

that "They came in all the time, yes, sir." (T.3l).

Thus,

the questions asked on redirect examination were not leading
at all, but in further search of the area opened up by
appellant's counsel on cross-examination.

The area of

questioning had also been explored on direct examination,
thereby establishing a foundation (T.29).
Appellant's argument that the questions are a
violation of Rules 19 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
is without merit.

Rule 19 deals with prerequisites of

knowledge and experience of witnesses as establishing a basis
for testimony on relevant or material matters.

The

applicable portion to this case reads:
As a prerequisite for the testimony
of a witness on a relevant or material
matter, there must be evidence that he
has personal knowledge thereof • • • •
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Rule 56, as applicable to this case, reacts in part:
(1) If the witness is not testifying
as an expert his testimony in the form of
opinion or inferences is limited to such
opinions or inferences as the judge finds
(a) may be rationally based on the perception
of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or to the
determination of the fact in issue . • • •
Clearly, the questions asked and the answers given were
based upon the personal observation; personal knowledge
and perception of the witness, Mike Martinez (T.29-33),
thus precluding a violation of the rules.
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that the
questions should not have been permitted, these admissions
would have been harmless error under Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, since they would not ".

probably had

a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict . . . "

I

In addition, appellant's counsel made no objection to the
testimony at the time, thus himself not complying with Rule
4(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Appellant's argument

is therefore without merit.
Appellant's fourth allegation of error concerns
the search of the apartment.

He states in his brief at

pages 9 and 10 that "There also exists a substantial
question as to whether the search of the appellant's
premises was constitutional error • •

Respondent

intially would point out that the premises searched did not
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1

belong to appellant.

Only co-defendant White lived on

the premises searched (T.l76).

Secondly, nothing was

found on the premises of an incriminating nature, with the
possible exception of the holster.

Even excluding the

admission of the holster, the verdict would not be affected,
nor would there be any likelihood thereof.

Finally,

appellant has never challenged the search up until this
point in time (it is still highly questionable whether he
is presently doing so), and has no standing to challenge
the search, since he did not reside there.
Appellant's final point of contention alleges
that the testimony of the Weber County jailer that appellant
and co-defendant were inmates at the jail and were housed in
the same area as the witness, Steve Shearer, was unduly
prejudicial and was not relevant to any issue in the trial.
It is obvious that the reason for calling the jailer to the
stand was to make it known that the codefendants and the
admitted robber, Shearer, being housed in the same area of
the jail, had ample opportunity to converse with each other
prior to trial, thereby enhancing the possibility of
"corroborating" their stories and testimony as to what
they would say at the trial (T.l03-106).

This goes to the

credibility of the co-defendants and Shearer, the admitted
robber and a twice convicted felon.
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The mentioning of appellant's incarceartion would
be totally harmless due to the fact that appellant was
dressed in prison or jail clothing, thereby making it known
to the jury that he was presently incarcerated, notwithstanding the testimony of the jailer.

Thereby, no error

or harm resulted.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that none of the issues raised
are of sufficient merit to support a claim of prejudice
or to have denied appellant a fair trial on the merits.
Judge Sawaya found no merit in appellant's allegations,
and respondent respectfully requests this Honorable Court
to so affirm his findings.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOiv
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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